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 HEIDEGGER'S HIDDEN PATH: FROM PHILOSOPHY TO
 POLITICS
 W. J. KORAB-KARPOWICZ
 If J.ARTIN Heidegger is widely acknowledged to be one of the most
 original and important philosophers of the twentieth century, while re
 maining one of the most controversial. His thinking has contributed
 to such diverse fields as phenomenology, existentialism, hermeneu
 tics, aesthetics, literary criticism, and theology. His critique of tradi
 tional metaphysics and his opposition to positivism and technological
 world domination have been embraced by leading theorists of post
 modernity. He influenced such prominent thinkers as Gadamer,
 Arendt, Habermas, Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard.1 On the other
 hand, his involvement in the Nazi movement has invoked a stormy de
 bate. Although he never claimed that his philosophy was concerned
 with politics, political considerations have come to overshadow his
 philosophical work. Especially after the publication of Victor Farias's
 Heidegger et le Nazisme in 1987 and Hugo Ott's Martin Heidegger:
 Unterwegs zu einer Biographie in 1988, it becomes difficult to treat
 Heidegger's political stance as irrelevant to his philosophical opus.2 In
 Correspondence to: Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University,
 06800 Ankara, Turkey.
 1 See Fred Dallmayr, Life-world, Modernity, and Critique: Paths be
 tween Heidegger and the Frankfurt School (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
 2 See Victor Farias, Heidegger et le nazisme (Paris: Verdier, 1987), and
 for the English edition, Heidegger and Nazism, ed. Joseph Margolis and Tom
 Rockmore, trans. Paul Burell and Gabriel R. Ricci (Philadelphia: Temple Uni
 versity Press, 1989). See also, Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu
 einer Biographie (Frankfurt-Main: Campus, 1988), and for the English trans
 lation, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life (New York: Basic Books, 1993).
 Related works include among others The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical
 Reader, ed. Richard Wollin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992);
 Julian Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
 versity Press, 1997); Fred Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
 University Press, 1993); and Thomas Sheehan, "Reading a Life: Heidegger and
 Hard Times," The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger (Cambridge: Cam
 bridge University Press, 1993), 70-96.
 The Review of Metaphysics 61 (December 2007): 295-315. Copyright ? 2007 by The Review of
 Metaphysics
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 the first edition, published in 1963, of his comprehensive and detailed
 study of the development of Heidegger's thought, Der Denkweg Mar
 tin Heideggers (Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking), Otto P?ggeler
 did not raise any political issues. Yet, in light of the controversy that
 gained a new momentum in the late 1980's such an approach seems
 no longer possible.3 The distinction between "two Heideggers"?one
 a philosopher and one a politician?is no longer tenable.4 Questions
 must be raised concerning Heidegger's philosophy and his political in
 volvement, and vice versa.
 One serious defect of the polemical writings that straightfor
 wardly charge Heidegger with Nazism is that they mostly represent a
 poor knowledge of his philosophy. Heidegger's writings are painfully
 difficult, even to specialists, and his concepts can be easily misinter
 preted, especially by those who, instead of searching for truth, em
 brace a prosecutor's zeal. For example, in his influential book, Farias
 completely avoids asking philosophical questions. His work, as many
 commentators agree, is "a jumble of truths, half-truths, insinuations,
 and innuendos?all presented with the same conviction and endowed
 with the same unquestioned authority."5 On the internet, one can eas
 ily find hundreds of articles by authors who claim that Heidegger's
 guilt has already been decided. My objective is not to blame or to ex
 onerate Heidegger before investigating the relationship between his
 philosophy and politics in depth. Obviously, given the limited nature
 of my presentation, I cannot consider Heidegger's entire philosophical
 opus. I intend to concentrate chiefly on his critique of the Western
 metaphysical tradition and on an interpretation of his most controver
 sial statement from An Introduction to Metaphysics about the "inner
 truth and greatness" of National Socialism.6 I will begin my investiga
 tion by considering a notorious episode in Heidegger's life, namely his
 3 In the second edition of his study, published in 1983, P?ggeler in
 cluded some observations about Heidegger's politics. This edition has be
 come the basis of the English translation. See Otto P?ggeler, Martin Heideg
 ger's Path of Thinking (Atlantic Heights, NJ: Humanities Press, 1987), 271
 83.
 4 Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger, 2.
 5 Ibid., 17.
 6 Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Man
 heim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), 166.
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 service as Rector of the University of Freiburg from April 1933 to Feb
 ruary 1934. Then I move to the essence of his philosophy, the quest
 for the meaning of Being, deduce a political theory from his ontology,
 and arrive at his politics. This way I attempt to throw some new light
 on the Heidegger controversy and to disclose the Heideggerian hidden
 path.
 I
 The Controversial Stage in Heidegger's Life. Heidegger's life en
 tered a problematic and controversial stage with Hitler's rise to
 power. In September 1930, Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German
 Workers' Party (NSDAP) became the second largest party in Germany,
 and on January 30, 1933 Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany.
 Up to then virtually apolitical, Heidegger now became politically in
 volved. On April 21, 1933, he was elected rector of the University of
 Freiburg by the faculty. He was apparently urged by his colleagues to
 become a candidate for this politically sensitive post, as he later
 claimed in an interview with Der Spiegel, to avoid the danger that a
 party functionary would be named rector.7 But he also seemed to be
 lieve that he could steer the Nazi movement in the right direction.8 On
 May 3,1933, he joined the NSDAP, or Nazi, party.9 On May 27,1933, he
 delivered his inaugural rectoral address on "The Self-Assertion of the
 German University."10 The ambiguous text of this speech has often
 7 See Martin Heidegger, "Spiegel Interview with Martin Heidegger," Mar
 tin Heidegger and National Socialism, ed. G?nter Neske and Emil Kettering,
 trans. Lisa Harries and Joachim Neugroschel (New York: Paragon House,
 1990). Although the interview took place on September 23, 1966, it was only
 published after his death, ten years later.
 8 See P?ggeler, 275; Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger, 25.
 9 Heidegger entered the Nazi party, as he wrote in 1945 in a letter to the
 de-Nazification commission at Freiburg University in 1945, in order to facili
 tate his relations with the Ministry of Education and Culture and "to attempt
 from within National Socialism, while having a point a reference to it, to
 bring a spiritual change in its development." Heidegger's letter is quoted in
 Karl A. Moehling, "Heidegger and the Nazis," Heidegger: The Man and the
 Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 31-43.
 10 Martin Heidegger, "The Self-Assertion of the German University,"
 Martin Heidegger and National Socialism.
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 been interpreted as an expression of his support for Hitler's regime.11
 During his tenure as rector he produced a number of speeches in the
 Nazi cause, such as, for example, "Declaration of Support for Adolf
 Hitler and th eNational Socialist State" delivered in November 1933.12
 There is little doubt that during that time, Heidegger placed the great
 prestige of his scholarly reputation at the service of National Social
 ism, and thus, willingly or not, contributed to its legitimization among
 his fellow Germans.13
 And yet, just one year later, on April 23, 1934, Heidegger resigned
 from his office and took no further part in politics.14 His rectoral ad
 dress was found incompatible with the party line, and its text was
 11 Martin Heidegger, "The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts," Mar
 tin Heidegger and National Socialism. In this text Heidegger attempts to
 show that his rectoral address, although often misunderstood, was meant to
 stress the self-determination of the university against external political pres
 sure. He also claims that in his capacity as rector, resisting pressure im
 posed on him, he prohibited the hanging of an anti-Jewish poster, which was
 a part of the campaign "against the un-German spirit" directed by Nazi minis
 ter of propaganda Joseph Goebbels, appointed deans who were not party
 members, and prevented a book burning by Nazi students.
 12 A good selection of these speeches can be found in The Heidegger
 Controversy: A Critical Reader, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge: MIT Press.
 1993), 40-60.
 13 That Heidegger placed his reputation in the service of National Social
 ism, and thus allowed it to be used by the Nazis as a propaganda tool, was
 the main charge made against him made by the de-Nazification commission
 at Freiburg University, which led to his ban from teaching in 1946. There are,
 however, witnesses who speak favorably about Heidegger's behavior. See
 Hans L. Gottschalk, "Heidegger as Rector," Martin Heidegger and National
 Socialism, 169-73. Gottschalk, a Jewish scholar who in 1938 emigrated to
 the United Kingdom, relates that among other things, Heidegger tried to pre
 vent anti-Semitic violence by the Nazi students and in the longer run proved
 to be unacceptable to the National Socialists as Rector.
 14 In February 1934 Heidegger was asked to dismiss Willhelm von M?l
 lendorf, dean of the Faculty of Medicine and former rector, and Erik Wolf,
 dean of the Faculty of Law, and to replace them with faculty members more
 acceptable to the Nazi party. Heidegger refused, and offered to resign, in the
 case that the Ministry should insist on this request. Since the Ministry con
 tinued to put pressure on him, at the end of the winter semester 1933/4, he re
 signed. He then refused to attend the ceremonial handing over of the rector
 ate to the successor appointed by the Ministry, who was called by the press
 "the first National Socialist rector of the university." See Heidegger, "The
 Rectorate 1933/34" and "Spiegel Interview." Heidegger's resignation can be
 related to the fact that by that time Heidegger was already disillusioned
 about the nature of National Socialism. Due to the rapid politicization of
 German society, the solidification of Nazi ideology into racism, and the grow
 ing atmosphere of terror, all Heidegger's hopes for a "spiritual change" in the
 development of Nazism from "within" must have been gone.
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 eventually banned by the Nazis.15 Because he was no longer involved
 in the party's activities, Heidegger's membership in the NSDAP be
 came a mere formality. Certain restrictions were put on his freedom
 to publish and attend conferences.16 In his lecture courses of the late
 1930s and early 1940s, and especially in the course entitled H?lderlin 's
 Hymnen "Germanien" und uDer Rein" (H?lderlin's Hymns "Germa
 nia" and "The Rhine") originally presented at the University of
 Freiburg during the winter semester of 1934/35, he expressed covert
 criticism of Nazi ideology.17 He came under attack of Ernst Krieck,
 semi-official Nazi philosopher.18 For some time he was under the sur
 veillance of the Gestapo. His final humiliation came in 1944, when he
 was declared the most "expendable" member of the faculty and sent
 to the Rhine to dig trenches. Following Germany's defeat in the Sec
 ond World War, Heidegger was accused of Nazi sympathies. He was
 forbidden to teach and in 1946 was dismissed from his chair of philos
 ophy. The ban was lifted in 1949.
 II
 The Quest for the Meaning of Being. Throughout his long life,
 Heidegger was preoccupied with the question of the meaning of Be
 ing.19 His first formulation of this question goes as far back as his high
 school studies, during which he read Franz Brentano's book On the
 Manifold Meaning of Being in Aristotle. In 1907, the seventeen-year
 old Heidegger asked: "If what-is is predicated in manifold meanings,
 then what is its leading fundamental meaning? What does Being
 mean?"20 The question of Being, unanswered at that time, becomes
 15 Heidegger's inaugural rectoral address bore no trace of the racism that
 sustained Nazism, nor of anti-Semitism. See Parvis Emad, "Elements of an
 Intellectual Portrait in H. W. Petzel's Memoirs," in Heinrich Wiegand Petzet,
 Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger (1929-1976), trans.
 Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maiy (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1993),
 xxii.
 16 See "The Rectorate 1933/34," 30-2.
 17 For an analysis of Heidegger's covert criticism of National Socialism
 see Fred Dallmayr, "Heidegger, H?lderlin, and Politics" in The Other Heideg
 ger, 132-48.
 18 Young, 2.
 19 When Heidegger says Being (Sein), he does not refer to what is tradi
 tionally understood as Being, namely to what is in general or to reality, but
 rather to the being of something.
 20 Heidegger, "My Way to Phenomenology," 74.
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 the leading question of Being and Time twenty years later.21 In accor
 dance with the method of philosophy which he employs in his funda
 mental treatise, before attempting to provide an answer to the ques
 tion of Being in general, Heidegger sets out to answer the question of
 the Being of the particular kind of entity that is the human being,
 which he calls Dasein. The vivid phenomenological descriptions of
 Dasein's being-in-the-world, especially Dasein's everydayness and res
 oluteness toward death, have attracted many readers with interests
 related to existential philosophy, theology, and literature. The basic
 concepts such as temporality, understanding, historicity, repetition,
 and authentic or inauthentic existence were carried over into and fur
 ther explored in his later works. Still, from the point of view of the
 quest for the meaning of Being, Being and Time was a failure and re
 mained unfinished.22 As Heidegger himself admitted in his later essay,
 "Letter on Humanism" (1946), the third division of its first part, enti
 tled "Time and Being," was held back "because thinking failed in ade
 quate saying of the turning and did not succeed with the help of the
 language of metaphysics."23 The second part also remained unwrit
 ten.
 "The turn" (Kehre) that occurs in the 1930's is the change in
 Heidegger's thinking mentioned above. The consequence of "the
 turn" is not the abandoning of the leading question of Being and
 Time. Heidegger stresses the continuity of his thought over the
 21 Sein und Zeit (Being and Time) originally appeared in 1927 in the
 Jahrbuch f?r ph?nomenologische Forschung edited by Edmund Husserl. It
 was then published by Max Niemeyer Verlag. Its seventh edition was first
 translated into English by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson and in
 1962 published by Basil Blackwell.
 22 In the "Preface to the Seventh German Edition" of Being and Time,
 published in 1953, Heidegger writes: "While the previous editions have borne
 the designation 'First Half,' this has now been deleted. After a quarter of a
 century, the second half could no longer be added unless the first were to be
 presented anew. Yet, the road it has taken remains even today a necessary
 one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being. For the elucida
 tion of this question, the reader may refer to my Einf?hrung in die Meta
 physik." This remark indicates the importance of the Introduction to Meta
 physics, the work which Heidegger singles out from among many as being
 the heir of Being and Time, his fundamental work. See Martin Heidegger,
 Being and Time, trans. John Macqurrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Basil
 Blackwell, 1978), 19.
 23 Martin Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," Pathmarks (Cambridge:
 Cambridge University Press, 1998), 250.
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 course of the change. Nevertheless, the question of the meaning of
 Being is reformulated in Heidegger's later work. It becomes a ques
 tion of the openness, that is, of the truth, of Being.24 Furthermore,
 since the openness of Being refers to a situation within history, the
 most important concept in the later Heidegger becomes the history of
 Being.25
 The lecture course, An Introduction to Metaphysics, was origi
 nally presented at the University of Freiburg in the summer semester
 of 1935, and can be seen as a bridge between the earlier and the later
 Heidegger.26 The fact that Heidegger acknowledges at the point of de
 parture of his inquiry in the Introduction to Metaphysics is that for us
 Being has become little more than an empty word with an evanescent
 meaning.27 This is, in his view, where we now stand. It is the funda
 mental phenomenon of the forgetfulness of Being that is characteris
 tic of modernity. But what if, Heidegger asks, Being is both the most
 obscure and the most complex concept? What if this concept is the
 one most worthy of being questioned? He believes that in fact the Be
 ing of beings has been a prominent theme of philosophy, and yet after
 the great beginnings of Western thought in ancient Greece, attempts
 24 Martin Heidegger, "On the Essence of Truth," Pathmarks, 154.
 25 For a reader unacquainted with the Heidegger's thought, both the
 "question of the meaning of Being" and the expression "history of Being" may
 sound strange. In the first place, such a reader can argue that when some
 thing is said to be, there is nothing expressed that the word "Being" could
 properly denote. Therefore, the word "Being" is a meaningless term, and the
 Heideggerian quest for the meaning of Being is, in general, a misunderstand
 ing. Secondly, our reader could also think that the Being of Heidegger would
 be no more likely to have a history than the Being of Aristotle. Hence, the
 "history of Being" is a misunderstanding as well. Yet Heidegger's task is pre
 cisely to show that there is in fact a meaningful concept of Being. "We under
 stand the 'is' we use in speaking," he claims, "although we do not compre
 hend it conceptually." If the Being whose meaning Heidegger seeks seems so
 elusive, almost like no-thing, it is because it is not an entity. It is not some
 thing; it is not a being. "Being is essentially different from a being, from be
 ings." The "ontological difference," the distinction between Being (das Sein)
 and beings (das Seiende), is fundamental for Heidegger. The forgetfulness of
 Being that, according to him, occurs in the course of Western philosophy
 amounts to the oblivion of this distinction.
 26 Heidegger's lecture course Einf?hrung in die Metaphysik was first
 published by Max Niemeyer Verlag in 1953. Its first English translation, An
 Introduction to Metaphysics by Ralph Manheim, was published in 1959 by
 the Yale University Press.
 27 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 42.
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 to think of Being precisely as Being failed over and over again.28 The
 history of Being can then be described as a gradual falling away from
 the primordial experience of Being itself which occurred in early
 Greek thought.29 The question of Being would still provide a stimulus
 to the researches of Plato and Aristotle, but it was precisely with them
 that this primordial experience of Being was covered over. This fate
 ful event was followed by the gradual slipping away of the difference
 between Being and beings. Called variously by different philosophers,
 Being was reduced to a being: idea, energeia, substantia, actualitas,
 objectivity, absolute concept, or will to power.30
 Ill
 Overcoming Metaphysics. For the later Heidegger, "Western phi
 losophy," in which there occurs forgetfulness of Being, is synonymous
 with "the tradition of metaphysics." Metaphysics inquires about the
 Being of beings, but in such a way that the question of Being as such is
 disregarded, and Being itself is obliterated.31 The Heideggerian "his
 tory of Being" can thus be regarded as the history of metaphysics,
 which is the history of Being's oblivion. However, looked at from an
 other angle, metaphysics is also the way of thinking that looks beyond
 beings toward their ground or basis. Each metaphysics seeks the fun
 28 Martin Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Al
 bert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 12-4.
 29 In Chapter 4 of the Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger discusses
 four distinctions: Being and becoming, Being and appearance, Being and
 thinking, Being and the ought. He attempts to show that in reference to the
 primordial Greek experience of Being, "Being" is not just an empty word, but
 can be considered to designate endurance, identity, presence, and laying be
 fore.
 30 Although explicitly mentioned at the end of Chapter 3, Heidegger's
 conception of the history of Being is only foreshadowed in the Introduction
 to Metaphysics.
 31 In fact, in the Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger implies that the
 term "metaphysics" is ambiguous. In reference to its etymological meaning,
 meta ta phusika is an inquiry that goes beyond beings and deals with Being.
 But in fact, Heidegger claims, Being as such remains concealed to metaphys
 ics as it developed in the philosophical tradition of the West, and was thus
 forgotten. See chapter 1.
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 damentum absolutum, the indisputable ground of what-is.32 In Des
 cartes, for example, this ground is attained through the "Cogito" argu
 ment.33 The Cartesian metaphysics is characterized by subjectivity,
 because it has its ground in the self-certain subject. Furthermore,
 metaphysics is not merely the philosophy which asks the question of
 the Being of beings. At the end of philosophy, that is, in our present
 age, where philosophy dissolves into particular sciences, the sciences
 still speak of the Being of what-is as a whole.34 In the wider sense of
 this term, metaphysics is thus, for Heidegger, any discipline which,
 whether explicitly or not, provides an answer to the question of the
 Being of beings and of their ground. In medieval times such a disci
 pline was scholastic philosophy, which defined beings as entia crea
 tum (created things) and provided them with their ground in ens per
 fectissimum (the perfect being), God. Today, it is modern
 technology, through which the contemporary human being establishes
 himself in the world by working with it in the various modes of mak
 ing and shaping.35 Technology forms and controls the human position
 in today's world. It masters and dominates beings in various ways.
 "In distinction from mastering beings, the thinking of thinkers is
 the thinking of Being."36 Heidegger believes that early Greek thinking
 was not yet metaphysics. Presocratic thinkers asked the question
 concerning the Being of beings, but did so in such a way that Being it
 self was laid open. They experienced the Being of beings as the pres
 encing (presence) of what is present. Being as presencing means en
 during in unconcealment, disclosing. Heidegger uses various
 32 Heidegger explores this issue particularly in his essay "The End of Phi
 losophy and the Task of Thinking," in On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stam
 baugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972).
 33 The Cogito argument (Latin cogito, "I think") is an argument employed
 by Descartes. Descartes' Cogito ergo sum ("I think therefore I exist") is an
 attempt to establish the existence of the self in any act of thinking, including
 the act of doubting.
 34 The modern sciences and technology, Heidegger claims, may try to
 conceal or deny their metaphysical origin, but they cannot dispense with it.
 35 See Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," The Question
 Regarding Technology and Other Essays (New York, Harper & Row, 1977),
 126.
 36 Martin Heidegger, Parmenides (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann,
 1982), 10.
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 descriptions in seeking to convey rightly the early Greek experience.
 What-is, what is present, the unconcealed, is "what appears from out
 of itself, in appearing shows itself, and in this self-showing mani
 fests."37 It is the "emerging arising, the unfolding that lingers."38 He
 describes this experience with the Greek words phusis (emerging
 dominance) and aletheia (unconcealment). He attempts to show that
 the early Greeks did not "objectify" beings (they did not try to reduce
 them to an object for the thinking subject), but they let them be as
 they were, as self-showing rising into unconcealment. They experi
 enced the phenomenality of what is present, its radiant self-showing.
 The departure of Western philosophical tradition from concern
 with what is present in presencing, from this unique experience that
 astonished the Greeks, has profound theoretical and practical
 consequences. It results in metaphysics. According to Heidegger, to
 day's metaphysics, in the form of technology and the calculative
 thinking related to it, has become so pervasive that there is no realm
 of life that is not subject to its dominance. It imposes its technologi
 cal-scientific-industrial character on human beings, making it the sole
 criterion of the human sojourn on earth.39 As it ultimately degener
 ates into ideologies and world-views, metaphysics provides an answer
 to the question of the Being of beings for contemporary men and
 women, but skillfully removes from their lives the problem of their
 own existence. Moreover, because its sway over contemporary hu
 man beings is so powerful, metaphysics cannot be simply cast aside
 or rejected. Any direct attempt to do so will only strengthen its hold.
 Metaphysics cannot be rejected, canceled or denied, but it can be
 overcome by demonstrating its nihilism. In Heidegger's use of the
 term, "nihilism" has a very specific meaning: it refers to the forgetful
 ness of Being.40 What remains unquestioned and forgotten in meta
 physics is Being; hence, it is nihilistic.
 37Ibid., 202-3.
 38 Ibid., 197.
 39 Enmeshed in a technological and ideological framework, human be
 ings become enframed in it. See Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concern
 ing Technology," The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays.
 40 In An Introduction to Metaphysics, 169, Heidegger says: "To forget
 about Being and merely to chase after beings?that is nihilism." Since Being
 as such remains forgotten in it, metaphysics is for him nihilistic by definition
 and the metaphysics of Plato is no less nihilistic than the metaphysics of Ni
 etzsche. For the discussion of Plato's and Nietzsche's nihilism, see Martin
 Heidegger, Nietzsche, vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Neske, 1989).
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 According to Heidegger, Western humankind in all its relations
 with beings is sustained by metaphysics. Every age, every human ep
 och, no matter however different they may be?Greece after the
 Presocratics, Rome, the Middle Ages, modernity?has asserted a
 metaphysics and, therefore, is placed in a specific relationship to
 what-is as a whole. Metaphysics inquires about the Being of beings,
 but it reduces Being to a being; it does not think Being as Being. Inso
 far as Being itself is obliterated in it, metaphysics is nihilism. Heideg
 ger attempts to demonstrate the nihilism of metaphysics in his ac
 count of the history of Being, which he sees as the history of Being's
 oblivion. His attempt to overcome metaphysics is not based on a com
 mon-sense positing of a different set of values or the setting out of an
 alternative world-view, but rather is related to his concept of history,
 the central theme of which is the repetition of the possibilities for ex
 istence. This means thinking Being back to the primordial beginning
 of the West?to the early Greek experience of Being?and repeating
 this beginning, so that the Western world can begin anew.
 An important aim of the later Heidegger is to recapture and re
 peat the original experience of the Being of beings that takes place at
 the beginning of Western thought. But the repetition of this experi
 ence is not for the sake of the Presocratics themselves. Heidegger's
 work is not a mere antiquarian, scholarly study of early Greek think
 ing, nor an affirmation of the long-lost Greek way of life. His project is
 set within the perspective of nihilism and Being's forgetfulness, both
 unknown to the Greeks, and has as a goal the future possibilities for
 human existence. It occurs as a listening that opens itself to the
 words of the Presocratics from our contemporary age, from the age of
 the world-picture and representation that is characterized by techno
 logical and ideological domination, and the oblivion of Being. In the
 beginning of philosophy, the task of the Greeks was to ask the ques
 tion "What are beings?" and hence to bring beings as such and as a
 whole to their first and simplest interpretation. In the end, the task is
 to bring into question what has been forgotten in a long tradition of
 metaphysics, and consequently to bring the Western world to a new
 beginning. The new beginning thus begins with the question of Being.
 IV
 From Ontology to a Political Theory. In Heidegger's sense, "on
 tology" is an inquiry in which the question of Being is raised.
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 Fundamental ontology is the philosophy that Heidegger develops in
 Being and Time. In his major treatise, Heidegger does not explicitly
 raise any issues that might suggest any direct link of this work to a po
 litical theory. Being and Time remains at first sight apolitical.41 This
 cannot, however, be said of his works following "the turn," in which
 Heidegger departs from his fundamental ontology. Especially in the
 Introduction to Metaphysics, we find many statements that have ei
 ther direct or indirect political bearing. Does any political philosophy
 emerge from the later Heidegger? Reproached once by Karl L?with
 for his alleged involvement in Nazi politics, Heidegger said in his own
 defense that L?with, as his former student, should have known that
 his thinking had long since left behind the "metaphysics of
 subjectivity."42 What, then, has the metaphysics of subjectivity to do
 with a political stand?
 For Heidegger, the metaphysics of subjectivity develops with
 Descartes and is synonymous with modernity. In the Cartesian phi
 losophy, metaphysics finds its indisputable ground in the self-certain
 subject.43 As that which is present for itself, the subject gives to be
 ings their actual presence as objects. It serves as the measure of all
 things and the ground of all truth. Accordingly, the world becomes
 matter to be arranged and conquered. Heidegger perceives the ulti
 mate expression of modernity in the drive for domination?in the will
 that wants to control everything. If the first great modern thinker is
 for him Descartes, the last one is Nietzsche. Nietzsche's concept of
 the will to power, the struggle for world domination, is exemplified in
 modern global ideologies, and especially in the three ideologies which
 41 For an attempt to see political themes in Being and Time, see Mark
 Blitz, Heidegger's Being and Time and the Possibility of Political Philoso
 phy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). Various attempts have been
 made to link Being and Time to Heidegger's politics. For a critical assess
 ment of these attempts, see Julian Young, Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism,
 chapters 2 and 3. Young says: "a great variety of political commitments can
 be persuasively argued for within the framework provided by Being and
 Time's conception of authentic historicity" (73). He argues that historicity,
 authenticity, resoluteness, and other basic concepts of Heidegger's funda
 mental work cannot be linked to fascism or to any other particular political
 perspective.
 42 See Emad, "Elements of an Intellectual Portrait in H. W. Petzel's Mem
 oirs," xiv.
 43 See the discussion of Descartes in "The End of Philosophy and the
 Task of Thinking."
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 Heidegger either mentions by name or alludes to: Americanism (posi
 tivism), Communism, and Nazism.44 Although there are certainly dif
 ferences between them, differences that make them struggle against
 each other, from a metaphysical point of view, as Heidegger plainly
 states, they are all the same.45 They all stand on the basis of both the
 metaphysics of subjectivity and the forgetfulness of Being. All of them
 are characterized by the will to control, which relies on the use of
 technology and leads to the absorption of the individual into a mass.
 Americanism, which is seen by Heidegger not as democracy or liberal
 ism but rather as a form of positivism, subjects the individual to tech
 nological planning and quantitative research techniques; Communism,
 to the collective organization of production; and Nazism, to a racially
 based organizational control.46
 What is most destructive in ideologies is not only that by means
 of intellect falsified into a mere cleverness they devastate the earth,
 but also that by removing the question of Being from their horizon
 they dehumanize and uproot human beings.47 As Heidegger tells us in
 his lecture courses on Nietzsche offered in 1940, the Nietzschean will
 to power ultimately leads human beings to be reduced to the level of
 beasts. Heidegger rejects any forms of collectivism, in which, by for
 saking reflection on their existence, human beings surrender them
 selves to something "greater" than themselves. Therefore, if there is
 any political theory implied in his writings, it is certainly not one that
 can be associated with fascism or Nazism.48 In his thought, he guides
 us to look upon politics without the mediation of the prism of modern
 44 These ideologies have also been described as "positivism, Marxism,
 and fascism." See Dallmayr, The Other Heidegger, 28.
 45 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 31 and 37.
 46Ibid., 38-9.
 47 To dehumanize is to obstruct the question of Being. For Heidegger,
 "humanism" means "that the essence of the human being is essential for the
 truth of Being," and understood in this sense, his humanism contradicts all
 other kinds of humanism, which he regards as metaphysical. See "Letter on
 Humanism," 262-3.
 48 Heidegger's philosophical writings "can actually be read an indictment
 of Nazism to the extent that the latter aimed at the imperial domination of the
 world based on racial-biological grounds." See Dallmayr, The Other Heideg
 ger, 125.
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 political ideologies. Rather than advocating any form of modern
 state, he returns to the notion of polis, which he refuses to identify
 with state or city-state, but translates as die St?tte, the place, the site
 of historical human dwelling among beings.49 Opposing the process
 of globalization and "purely technological" relationships by which all
 relations to nature are destroyed, he states that "everything essential
 and great has only emerged when human beings had a home and were
 rooted in the tradition."50 He urges us to ask the essential question of
 Being first and then only from this perspective to look for political so
 lutions. As a powerful critic of modernity, who denies both the idea
 of progress and the idea of perfection related to it, he lays foundations
 for post-modernism.51
 V
 From Theory to Politics. If, for Heidegger, Nazism is a nihilistic
 and dehumanizing ideology based in the metaphysics of subjectivity, a
 modern ideology with which his thought cannot be identified, how
 should we then understand his most controversial statement from the
 Introduction to Metaphysics, about the "inner truth and greatness" of
 National Socialism?52 First, this statement, made during a lecture de
 livered in 1935, can be regarded as ironic and as an expression of
 49 Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, 128.
 50 Heidegger, "Spiegel Interview," 56.
 51 For its adherents, modernity is a path of progress, culminating in the
 perfection of humanity. Post-modernism denies the idea of progress and re
 jects the notion that the purported end of modernity is the perfection of hu
 manity. History lacks teleology and evolution. Modernity is thus not a model
 to follow; it is arbitrary. See John A. Vasquez, "The Post-Positivist Debate:
 Reconstructing Scientific Enquiry and International Relations after the En
 lightenment's Fall," International Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth
 and Steve Smith (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 219.
 52 The full statement in my translation reads: "Particularly, what is now
 generally regarded as the philosophy of National Socialism, but which has
 nothing to do with the inner truth and greatness of this movement (namely,
 the encounter between global technology and modern humanity), is fishing
 in these troubled waters of 'values' and 'totalities.'" See Heidegger, An Intro
 duction to Metaphysics, 166.
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 Heidegger's growing disappointment with actual National Socialism.
 To assess it properly, we have to consider the context in which it was
 made. In the context of a totalitarian state, where attitudes of loyalty
 to the ideology and hostility to its opponents are imposed in a particu
 larly intensive fashion, even a slight criticism of the regime can be sub
 jected to severe punishment. On the other hand, in such a context,
 any critical allusion or covert criticism becomes transparent to those
 who keep their ears open. It would then be immediately clear to the
 attentive audience of Heidegger's lecture that the "inner truth and
 greatness" of National Socialism did not imply its outward truth and
 real greatness. They would regard this statement not as a support of
 the actual Nazi movement but rather as a criticism of it.53 However, if
 we add to this statement the passage printed in parentheses, "namely,
 the encounter between global technology and modern humanity"
 (which was, according to Heidegger's testimony, not actually uttered
 during the lecture, but already present in the lecture notes), then an
 additional interpretation is needed.54 In what sense was National So
 cialism for him related to "the encounter between global technology
 and modern humanity"?
 The essence of technology lies in enframing.55 By enframing,
 technology puts humanity in its "frame" (Ge-stell). Human beings be
 come framed and challenged by the power that manifests itself as the
 essence of technology and that they no longer can control. Yet Na
 tional Socialism, as Heidegger says as late as 1966 in the interview
 with Der Spiegel, moved in the direction of achieving "an adequate re
 lationship to the essence of technology."56 This and additional state
 ments from that interview give us a clue as to how fully to understand
 53 In a letter that Heidegger wrote in 1968 as a clarification of the state
 ment, he says: "The listeners who understood this lecture, therefore, also
 grasped how the sentence was to be understood. Only the party informers
 who, as I knew, sat in my courses, understood it otherwise, as they well
 should have." See P?ggeler, Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking, 277.
 54 Heidegger says: "The reason I did not read that passage aloud was be
 cause I was convinced that my audience would understand me correctly."
 See Heidegger, "Spiegel Interview," 54.
 55 Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," 26.
 56Heidegger, "Spiegel Interview," 61.
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 his 1935 statement about the "inner truth and greatness" of National
 Socialism. Heidegger implies that National Socialism moved in the di
 rection of "age-old traditions" of thought, and that those, once awak
 ened, could assist human beings in making possible "a free relation
 ship (that is, not based on enframing) to the technological world."57 It
 moved in that direction initially, but did not go very far, because
 "those people (that is, the Nazi leaders) were much too limited in their
 thinking to gain a really explicit relationship to what is happening to
 day and what has been under way for three centuries."58
 What follows from these statements is that Heidegger initially as
 sociated National Socialism with a movement that would bring Ger
 many back to its "age-old traditions," renew its spiritual strength, and
 take it away from the heritage of modernity that has been developing
 since the seventeenth century.59 Bringing Germany back to its ancient
 traditions constituted for him the "inner truth and greatness" of this
 movement.60 He saw in it an antidote against modernism. However,
 57 Ibid.
 58 Ibid.
 59 "To justify their political system, the Nazis were willing to reach deep
 into the German past and to appropriate as much as they could. They would
 go to ancient times to conjure up idealistic pictures of German valor, purity,
 and virtue, of tribes loyally attached to their leaders, of heroic, ruthless war
 riors." Hans Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi
 Germany (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 30.
 60 There is still another interpretation possible, namely, that of Christian
 E. Lewalter, who in the prestigious weekly Die Zeit claimed that Heidegger
 understood the National Socialist movement as "a symptom of the tragic col
 lision of technology and man" and only believed that "as such a symptom" it
 had a "greatness." See Karsten Harries's "Introduction" to Martin Heidegger
 and National Socialism, xvii. Heidegger, who in a letter to the editor en
 dorsed Lewalter's interpretation himself, seems to repeat it again during his
 Spiegel interview, when, pressed by the interviewer and apparently con
 fused, he admits that the same greatness can be assigned to the Communist
 movement and Americanism. See "Spiegel Interview," 54. However, this ad
 mission is not consistent with what he says later in the same interview.
 Since the Nazis were indeed trying to reach deep into the German past, the
 interpretation which links the "greatness" with bringing Germany to ancient
 traditions can be supported not only by the text of the interview, but also by
 historical research. Also, Otto P?ggeler believed that Heidegger allowed
 himself to be misled in his later interpretation of the statement and was con
 fused. See P?ggeler, 277.
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 he was soon disillusioned. Although the Nazis indeed tried to revive
 German traditions and regarded modernism as a disease, they at the
 same time engaged in building a totalitarian state and developed an
 ideology that was philosophically unacceptable to Heidegger.61 The
 actual National Socialism, run by people who "were much too limited
 in their thinking," and with its political violence and book burning, to
 talitarian control of the vital resources of the state and the racial com
 position of the people, and politicization of society and mass rallies,
 was precisely the ideology which he covertly criticized in his writings,
 along with Americanism and Communism. And yet, because of his be
 lief in the "inner truth and greatness" of National Socialism, which, as
 the Spiegel interview proves, he cherished to the very end of his life,
 Heidegger remains politically an ambiguous figure. His statements
 about suspending moral judgments about violence, at the time of ris
 ing terror in Nazi Germany, and his criticism of Christianity, whose
 roots he traces to Judaism, at the time of the anti-Jewish campaign
 and the growing political pressure against the Catholic Church, can
 make one uneasy to say the least.62 A number of his convictions,
 which he expresses in the Introduction to Metaphysics, such as that
 of Germany being the central nation in Europe and of the crucial role
 61 After assuming political power, Adolf Hitler intended to create an en
 vironment for "healthy" German art, music, and literature. Modernism was
 defined in biological terms as a disease. The so-called "racial aliens" in art,
 music, and literature, and especially Jewish writers, were considered carriers
 of the disease, infecting the German mind and soul. The "Germanic Aryans"
 were regarded as the only "race" that was the bearer of human culture. The
 Nazi regime declared all modernist art, music, and literature "degenerate"
 and made it official policy to rid the nation of these works and their produc
 ers. The result was the largest forced emigration of artists, writers, and
 scholars recorded in history. See Micheal Burleigh and Wolfgang Wipper
 mann, The Racial State: Germany 1933-1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni
 versity Press, 1991); see also Ehrhard Bahr and Carolyn See, Literary Exiles
 and Refugees in Los Angeles (Los Angeles: William Andrew Clark, 1998).
 62 See Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Chapter 4, Section 3.
 A part of Heidegger's "dream" was a new religion, cleansed of foreign, that is,
 Jewish and Christian, ingredients. He dreamed about the "new" gods of the
 Germans. He thus followed the philosopher and Nazi ideologist Herman
 Schwarz in the latter's attempt to lay the foundations of "transcendental Na
 tional Socialism." See Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis, 108; P?ggeler, Martin
 Heidegger's Path of Thinking, 273.
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 of the German language and culture, parallel Nazi beliefs.63 To the Na
 zis as well, the German nation and its glorification were the focus of
 political thinking.
 VI
 What for??Where to??and What then? Heidegger perceives
 the metaphysical culture of the West as a continuity. It begins with
 Plato and ends with modernity and the dominance of science and
 technology. He thus implies in a post-modernist fashion that Nazism
 and the atom bomb, Auschwitz and Hiroshima, have been something
 like the "fulfillment" of the tradition of Western metaphysics and tries
 to distance himself from that tradition.64 He turns to the Presocratics
 in order to retrieve a pre-metaphysical mode of thought that would
 serve as a starting point for a new beginning. However, his grand vi
 sion of the essential history of the West and of nihilism (an idea he
 borrows from Nietzsche65) can be questioned. Modernity, which in its
 63 See Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis, 29-52 and 101-24. Sluga convincingly
 argues that although there was a deep disunity and lack of coherence in the
 Nazi ideology, which contained both traditional and radical elements, it was
 profoundly influenced by selective interpretations of Fichte and Nietzsche,
 thinkers by whom Heidegger was also deeply influenced. From Fichte, the
 Nazis took the ideas of a crisis that demanded the total reeducation of the
 German people, of the primordial character of the Germans and their lan
 guage, of the contrast between what was German and what was un-German,
 of the unique calling of the Germans and of their affinity with the Greeks.
 Heidegger's use of such themes as crisis, nation, and leadership, as well as
 his belief in Germany being the central nation in Europe and in the crucial
 role of the German language and culture, can be attributed to Fichte. Ni
 etzsche was for the Nazis the philosopher of political heroism, and was re
 garded as the true philosopher of their ideology and movement. Like Fichte,
 Nietzsche, and following him Heidegger, believed a crisis had reached Ger
 many, a crisis that was to be resolved only through a rebirth of German cul
 ture.
 64 The post-modernists often use the image of the destruction of Hi
 roshima to show where rationality might lead. See Ken Booth, "Dare not to
 Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future," International Re
 lations Theory Today, 331. Although Heidegger did not specifically men
 tioned Auschwitz and Hiroshima when making critical remarks about moder
 nity, he spoke of gas chambers and of hydrogen bombs. See note 70.
 65 Nietzsche thought of Christianity as decadent and nihilistic, and re
 garded it as a part of a larger nihilism that had been a fate of the West since
 Plato. Heidegger owes his conception of nihilism to Nietzsche, but he re
 works it in light of his own ontology. See Sluga, Heidegger's Crisis, 48-9.
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 development involves not only a technological but also a social revo
 lution, which sets individuals loose from religious and ethnic commu
 nities, from parishes and family bonds, which affirms materialistic val
 ues and assigns supremacy to the masses, can be regarded as a radical
 departure from earlier classical and Christian traditions. Contrary to
 Heidegger's argument, rather than being a mere continuity, the "essen
 tial" history of the West can then be seen as a history of radical trans
 formations. Christianity challenges the classical world while assimi
 lating some aspects of it, and is in turn challenged by modernity.
 Modernity overturns the ideas and values of the traditional (classical
 and Christian) culture of the West, and, once it becomes global, leads
 to the erosion of other traditional cultures.66
 Under the cover of immense speculative depth and rich ontologi
 cal vocabulary full of intricate wordplay, which make the reading of
 his writings so difficult, Heidegger expresses a simple political vision.
 In spite of its anti-modern edge and post-modern flavor, this vision is
 modern through and through. Heidegger is a revolutionary thinker
 who denies the traditional philosophical division between theory and
 practice, and this is especially clear when he boldly declares that "we
 have embarked on the great and long venture of demolishing a world
 that has grown old and of rebuilding it authentically anew."67 Like
 other modern political thinkers, he is guided by his abstract ideas, and
 in the name of those ideas wants to initiate a world revolution. He
 wants to overturn the traditional culture of the West and build it anew
 on the basis of earlier traditions in the name of Being. Like other
 thinkers of modernity, he adopts an Eurocentric perspective and sees
 the revival of German society as a condition for the revival of Europe
 (or the West), and that of Europe as a condition for the revival of for
 the whole world; like them, while rejecting God as an end, he attempts
 to set up fabricated ends for human beings.68 Ultimately, in the Spie
 gel interview, he expresses his disillusionment with his philosophical
 project and says: "Philosophy will not be able to bring about a direct
 change of the present state of the world. . . . The greatness of what is
 66 For such an alternative to Heidegger's reading of the history of the
 West, see Andrew Gamble, An Introduction to Modern Political Thought
 (London: Macmillan, 1981).
 67 An Introduction to Metaphysics, 106.
 68 Following Nietzsche, Heidegger proclaims the death of God. How
 ever, with this expression he does not want to assert an ordinary atheism.
 Rather, he intends to say that "the supersensible world, especially the world
 of the Christian God, has lost its effective force in history." See "The Rector
 ate 1933/34," 18.
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 to be thought is too great."69 Like Being, which he describes as "dis
 closing self-concealing," after making a disclosure Heidegger with
 draws; after stirring up a revolution, he leaves all its problems to oth
 ers. He says "only a God can still save us," but the God for whom, in
 the absence of philosophical thought, he now looks is clearly not that
 of the Christians or of any contemporary religion.70
 Heidegger tells us that in order to begin anew we need to go to
 the "age-old," that is, pre-classical and pre-metaphysical traditions of
 thought. He invokes the concept of the ancient polis. On the other
 hand, he does not want to concern himself with the question of ethics
 beyond saying that the word *'ethics appeared for the first time in the
 school of Plato,"71 thus implying that all ethics does not think the truth
 of Being and is nihilistic. Consequently, he does not consider the fact
 that even in pre-Platonic and pre-Socratic times a Greek polis was an
 ethical community, in which moral questions were raised and dis
 cussed.72 The Iliad and Odyssey of Homer, the poems of Hesiod and
 the tragedies of Sophocles, as well as the other ancient Greek texts,
 including the monumental political work of Thucydides, the History
 of the Peloponnesian War, express concerns with ethical behavior on
 both individual and community levels.73 Furthermore, the strength of
 Western civilization, insofar its roots can be traced to ancient Greece,
 is that from its beginning it was based on rationality, understood as
 free debate, and the affirmation of fundamental moral values. When
 ever it turned to irrationality and moral relativism, as in Communism
 and Nazism, that civilization was in decline. Therefore, Heidegger is
 mistaken in his diagnosis of the ills of the contemporary society, and
 69 See "Spiegel Interview," 56-7 and 66.
 70Ibid., 57.
 71 Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," 269.
 72 Beginning with the Homeric epics, ancient Greek literature dealt with
 such important questions as the relationship between individual and commu
 nity, the importance of justice in the governance of the state, the distinction
 between offensive and defensive wars, and the danger of insolent or hubris
 tic individual behavior. Ethics was an integral part of ancient Greek society
 and analysis of an individual character was commonplace in ancient Greece
 long before Plato. For an excellent discussion of early Greek ethics, see
 Mary Frances Williams, Ethics in Thucydides: The Ancient Simplicity (Lan
 ham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1998).
 73 Following Nietzsche, Heidegger conceals these ethical concerns in his
 translations and interpretations of ancient texts. For example, see his trans
 lation of the first chorus from Sophocles' Antigone, in An Introduction to
 Metaphysics, chapter 4.
This content downloaded from 139.179.72.98 on Tue, 10 Jul 2018 15:14:58 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 HEIDEGGER'S HIDDEN PATH  315
 his solution to those ills is also wrong. Asking the question of Being
 (and, drawing our attention to this question is his significant contribu
 tion) is an important addition to, but can never replace, asking moral
 questions in the spirit of rationality and freedom.74
 VII
 Thinking Beyond Heidegger. Modernity is for Heidegger an age
 that is marked by an ongoing ideological struggle for global domina
 tion. By asking the question of the meaning of Being, he attempts to
 show the limitations of the modern project, linking it with the meta
 physical tradition of the West and its nihilism. Translated into politi
 cal terms, this means that he could not support Nazism that he re
 garded as one of modern ideologies, along with Americanism and
 Communism. His post-metaphysical thinking, which he develops es
 pecially after the "turn," is critical of all ideological perspectives. And
 yet, as I have tried to show, Heidegger is politically an ambiguous fig
 ure and the post-modernism that he initiates, whose subject is theory
 as well as action, is still embedded in the unfinished project of moder
 nity.
 A general tendency of thinking is that it slips into metaphysics.
 Post-modern thinking is not free from that tendency either. It solidi
 fies into a new ideology. A post-Heideggerian philosophy must be one
 that considers limitations of his thought, and of the post-modern
 thinking that he initiated. Such a thinking asks the Heideggerian ques
 tion of Being, but it also comes back to the fundamental question of
 "What is right?" that he disregarded.
 Bilkent University
 74 The fact that Heidegger did not appreciate the significance of the ques
 tion of ethics led him to make such an unfortunate statement as: "Agriculture
 is now a motorized food industry; in its essence it is the same thing as the
 manufacture of corpses in gas chambers, the same as blockades and the re
 duction of a region to hunger, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen
 bombs." By being unable to draw basic moral distinctions on the basis of his
 philosophy, and thus by making a statement like this, in which he equated
 mechanized agriculture with death in gas chambers, he displayed a serious
 drawback of his thought, and his personal political naivete and moral insensi
 tivity. Cited after Karsten Harries, introduction to Martin Heidegger and Na
 tional Socialism, xxx.
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